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Considerable labor mobility exists within the U.S., enough that, if migration arbitrages un-
employment dierences, one might expect very low cross-state unemployment dierences.
However, local unemployment data reveal that there are large cross-state unemployment
dierences. A dynamic general equilibrium model of worker migration and job search is
introduced to account for these data features. The interaction between location-specic in-
dividual productivity and rm-worker trading frictions is important for understanding local
unemployment. In the model, labor mobility and aggregate unemployment are negatively
related, a prediction that is in stark contrast to the standard theory of sectoral reallocation,
but consistent with the U.S. data.
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There is a great deal of labor mobility within the U.S. In fact, there is more than enough
mobility that if workers were moving in order to arbitrage away dierences in unemployment
rates, one should observe virtually no dierences in unemployment rates. However, local area
data reveal large dierences in unemployment rates across states. To give some idea of the
magnitude of these dierences, they are roughly the same size as the cyclical variations in
the national unemployment rate. These cross-state unemployment rate dierences remain
large, even after controlling for state xed eects. Given the large and persistence dierences
in state unemployment rates, and given the high inter-state labor mobility, it seems natural
to ask why unemployment rates are so dierent across states.
One can explain these data features by simply assuming non-economic factors, such
as preference shocks or shifts in local attractiveness, as the driving force of individuals'
relocation decisions. However, empirical studies that use both micro and sub-national level
data consistently nd that inter-state migration decisions are in
uenced to a substantial
extent by income and employment prospects.1 In addition, the Current Population Survey
(CPS) reveals that an inter-state move is more likely to be made for work-related reasons.
More important, if workers move across regions for non-economic reasons we would expect
no cyclical pattern in labor mobility. However, this is inconsistent with the procyclicality of
labor mobility documented below.
This paper explores whether it is possible to have large unemployment dierences across
local markets when labor mobility is driven by income and employment. The question is
answered by developing an equilibrium multi-sector model by building on the island model
of Lucas and Prescott (1974).2 Our model makes two important departures from theirs.
1Greenwood (1997) surveys the earlier literature on internal migration. For recent micro studies that
relate individual earnings to geographic mobility, see, for example, Mincer (1978); Borjas, Bronars and Trejo
(1992); Dahl (2002) and Kennan and Walker (2011). Topel (1986) and Blanchard and Katz (1992) argue
that labor mobility across states is sensitive to local labor market conditions.
2A representative sample of recent studies that build on Lucas and Prescott's framework might include
Rogerson (1987); Alvarez and Veracierto (1999, 2000); Kambourov and Manovskii (2009); Coen-Pirani (2010);
Alvarez and Shimer (2011).
1First, within each island, there are trading frictions as modeled in the Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides (DMP) model.3 Consequently, a worker can be unemployed when not moving
across islands. Thus, unlike Lucas and Prescott's model, our model makes an explicit dis-
tinction between unemployment and mobility. Second, workers on the same island can dier
by their location-specic productivity, which evolves stochastically.4 Because of this location-
match eect, some workers can be better o staying on an island with high unemployment if
they have better location-specic productivity on the island. Conversely, some workers may
choose to leave a low unemployment island if their productivity on the island is lower than
the average productivity of the rest of the residents.
The key elements of the model are calibrated using the CPS and sub-national level U.S.
data released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The model accounts for observed
cross-state variation in unemployment while allowing for high labor mobility. The model
is also able to generate main features of state-level labor market dynamics, including those
documented in the seminal work of Blanchard and Katz (1992).
Models that do not explicitly distinguish between mobility and unemployment cannot
explain the observed procyclicality of gross mobility. For example, in the Lucas and Prescott
(1974) model, mobility and unemployment move together. This prediction is thought to
have motivated Lilien (1982) to argue that sectoral mobility induced by sectoral shifts in
labor demand are mainly responsible for cyclical variation in unemployment. However,
using data on unemployment and vacancies, Abraham and Katz (1986) argue that cyclical
variations in unemployment are primarily driven by aggregate shocks rather than sectoral
shifts. Our model generates a negative correlation between unemployment and mobility using
an aggregate shock. These results indicate that introducing within-market search frictions
and location-specic eects into an otherwise standard island model greatly improves the
model's prediction by breaking the tight link of unemployment and mobility in the model, and
3See, among others, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994); Pissarides (2000); Hall (2005); Shimer (2005);
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008); Bils, Chang and Kim (2011).
4This is consistent with Borjas et al. (1992); Dahl (2002) and Kennan and Walker (2011), who nd that
a substantial fraction of variance in the earnings of workers is due to the location-match eect.
2thus provides a 
exible framework within which important welfare issues can be formulated
and analyzed.
There is a large literature on persistent dierences between geographic areas in aggregate
variables such as income and employment. Among these studies, those that allow for labor
mobility mainly focus on net mobility.5 For example, Topel (1986) and Blanchard and Katz
(1992) study local labor market 
uctuations by attributing relative shifts in the local labor
force to geographic mobility. Therefore, these papers treat net mobility, but only implicitly.
Recent work by Coen-Pirani (2010) makes an important contribution to this literature by
allowing for both net and gross mobility in an equilibrium multi-sector model to analyze labor
mobility across the U.S. Our work is related to his as we also allow for net and gross mobility
across markets, but we extend it by including the unemployment dimension. From the point
of view of studying regional dierences in aggregate variables, the paper establishes a link
between the mostly empirical literature on local labor market dynamics (e.g., Blanchard and
Katz, 1992) and the standard equilibrium unemployment theories (e.g., Lucas and Prescott,
1974 and Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994).
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 measures cross-state unem-
ployment and inter-state labor mobility. Section 3 presents a simplied version of the model
and shows how rm-worker trading frictions and idiosyncratic location-specic productiv-
ity aect unemployment and mobility. Section 4 presents and solves the full version of the
model. Section 5 provides a further analysis on how a labor market in the model economy
evolves following a local shock. The model's prediction on the cyclicality of labor mobility is
discussed in Section 6. The conclusions of the paper are drawn in Section 7. The appendices
5Net mobility refers to the dierence between in- and out-migration of a local market, while gross mobility
is dened as the total number of workers moving between the markets. If a local market can experience both
in- and out-migration, there can be a large gap between net and gross mobility. For example, there can be
large gross mobility without any net mobility if in- and out-migration of each market cancels out.
3provide further empirical analysis and technical details.
2 Facts
This section measures cross-state unemployment dierences and compares them with inter-
state labor mobility.
2.1 Cross-state dierences in unemployment
The coecient of cross-state variation. Cross-state dierences in unemployment are mea-
sured using the coecient of variation of unemployment across the states. Let ui;t denote the
unemployment rate of state i and ut the aggregate unemployment rate of the U.S. at time









ri;t denotes the relative unemployment of state i: ri;t =
ui;t
ut . The coecient of variation is
measured using seasonally adjusted monthly state unemployment and labor force series con-
structed by the BLS.6 Between Jan. 1976 and May 2011, CV0 of cross-state unemployment
ranges from 0.175 to 0.346 with an average of 0.237.
A comparison with cyclical and cross-country unemployment. To have an idea of how large
this variation is, cross-state unemployment dierences are compared with cyclical aggregate
unemployment, which is considered to be one of the most volatile aggregate variables. The
data show that the coecient of variation of monthly aggregate unemployment over the
same period is 0.245. Thus, the cross-sectional unemployment is as big as the variation
of aggregate unemployment over time. Another dimension where unemployment exhibits
considerable variation is across countries. The OECD data reveal that between 2003 and
2010, cross-country dierences among European countries (CV0) averages at 0.404. When
two outliers, Spain, where average unemployment is more than 12 percent, and Switzerland,
6The BLS constructs these series using the Current Population Survey, the Current Employment
Statistics, and State Unemployment Insurance Systems. The BLS's methodology is described at http:
//www.bls.gov/lau/home.htm.
4where it is less than 4 percent, are excluded, the coecient of variation goes down to 0.355.
These numbers suggest that unemployment dierences across the U.S. states are approxi-
mately 60 percent of unemployment dierences across European countries, suggesting that
there are large cross-sectional dierences even within a country.
Dierences at the individual level. It is possible that dierences in unemployment between
local labor markets are small for most of the labor force while a few states have dispropor-
tionately high or low unemployment. If the cross-state unemployment dierences measured
by CV0 are generated largely by smaller states, then those dierences would not be of much
interest, at least from the macroeconomic perspective. To examine if this is the case, the







2, where Li;t denotes state i's
labor force at time t while L0;t is the U.S. labor force at t, i.e. L0;t =
P51
i=1 Li;t.7 During the
sample period, CVL averages 0.204, indicating that spatial dierences in unemployment are
also large at the individual level.
Controlling for state xed eects. Blanchard and Katz (1992) nd that state relative unem-
ployment rates exhibit no trend. They also report a very low correlation for relative state
unemployment rates between time periods 10 to 20 years apart. Therefore, their ndings
suggest that state xed eects are not that large. This also indicates that the permanent
dierences in local attractiveness are not the main reason for regional unemployment dier-
ences. Nevertheless, to quantify dierences in unemployment that are solely due to cyclical







2, where ri is
the mean relative unemployment rate of state i over the sample period. The coecient of
variation CVFL averages 0.148, which shows that the cross-state dierences in unemploy-
ment remain large even after controlling for state xed eects. The data appendix explores
dierent ways to measure cross-state unemployment. The conclusion remains quite robust.
7Since unemployment of smaller states may have measurement errors due to their small sample size, CVL
also corrects for a potential upward bias in CV0.
5Unemployment dierences measured by CV0, CVL and CVFL are summarized in Table 1.
2.2 Mobility
Gross mobility. Since migration plays an important role in equilibrating unemployment rates
across regions, the measured unemployment dierences are compared with inter-state labor
force migration. To distinguish between dierent measures of mobility, the following nota-
tion is introduced. Let nI
i;t denote the number of people who in-migrate to state i and nO
i;t the
number of people who out-migrate from the state at time t. Then, the aggregate mobility








L0;t . Migration 
ows are measured using the BLS's Annual
Demographic Survey (a.k.a. the March CPS), which records its respondents' current state
of residence and the state they were living in a year ago. In- and out-migration of the states
are constructed for the period 1981-2010, except for 1985 and 1995, years for which the CPS
does not record the previous state of residence. Our sample includes adult civilians aged
20-64 years who are in the labor force, but it excludes movers from foreign countries. Over
the sample period, mt averaged 0.03 per year, meaning that 3 percent of the labor force
changed their state of residence each year.
A comparison between mobility and cross-state unemployment. Given these facts, one can
ask whether the observed annual mobility is too high or too low. The question is answered
by comparing observed mobility with minimum mobility that is just enough to arbitrage
cross-state dierences in unemployment. This minimum mobility also eectively measures
the number of workers who create the observed cross-state dierences. To eliminate cross-
state unemployment, one needs to move workers from states with unemployment rates above
the aggregate unemployment rate to those with lower unemployment rates until there is no
more regional unemployment. Specically, the minimum number of workers needed to elim-
inate cross-state dierences is
X
i
Li(ui   u)Ii, where Ii takes a value of 1 if ui > u, or
zero otherwise. Over the sample period, the minimum mobility rate ranges from 0.003 to
60.009 with an average of 0.005. This is much smaller than the measured mobility rate of
0.03. Although this thought experiment does not take into account how the local markets
respond to mobility and how individuals make their moving decisions, it does suggest that
labor mobility is much larger than cross-sectional unemployment.









Li;t, have little variation across states (as seen from their small standard deviations
reported in Table 2). This indicates that there is a small gap between in- and out-migration
at the state level. Put dierently, net migration, mO
i;t   mI
i;t, is much smaller than both mI
i;t
and mO
i;t in absolute terms. We now quantify this small net migration. For this purpose,
let i;t = mO
i;t   mI
i;t. State i's net mobility is dened as the standard deviation of i;t over
time. A weighted average of these state-specic standard deviations using the labor share of
each state as the weight is m = 0:011, which is much smaller than 0:03, the annual mobility
rate. So, cyclical shifts in the local labor force are much smaller than overall mobility and,
therefore, most moves between states cancel out.8
3 The homogeneous islands model
Our goal is to develop an equilibrium multi-sector model that is capable of reproducing
the facts presented above. Specically, we develop our model by considering the following
key features of the U.S. data: (i) unemployed workers are not necessarily movers; (ii) net
labor mobility across regions is much lower than gross mobility; and (iii) there are large
cross-sectional dierences in unemployment. The development of the model is necessarily
constrained by a trade-o between complexity and tractability. Given this constraint, we
focus on how local unemployment and mobility are jointly determined in equilibrium.
For clarity purposes, the model is presented in two steps. First, an economy of a contin-
8Appendix A.3 measures the extent to which in- and out-migration cancel out. Also, see Coen-Pirani
(2010) for other features of inter-state worker 
ows.
7uum of islands with the same labor market conditions and thus the same unemployment is
considered. In the economy, large labor mobility across islands are driven by idiosyncratic
location-specic productivity. There is no net mobility in this economy; that is, for each
island, in-migration equals out-migration. Workers searching for a job locally become em-
ployed with a probability of less than one. This economy is referred to as the homogeneous
islands model. In the second step, a stochastic local technology shock is introduced. The
shock shifts local labor market conditions and local unemployment. Consequently, an island's
in- and out-migration can dier from each other. The economy with the local technology
shock will be referred to as the heterogeneous islands model.
3.1 Environment
The economy is composed of a continuum of islands inhabited by a measure one of workers
and a continuum of rms. Workers and rms are both risk-neutral and innitely lived.
Individuals are either employed or unemployed. Being employed means being matched with
a rm. Each period an unemployed worker chooses to stay on the current island to search for a
job or to move to another island to look for a better opportunity. The cost of moving between
any two islands is C.9 Workers are subject to an idiosyncratic island-specic productivity
shock, x. Per-period output of a rm-worker match is given by the worker's location-specic
productivity x.
All matches are dissolved at an exogenous rate . Firms look for workers by creating
vacancies. The 
ow cost of a vacancy at productivity level x is kx.10 Within each island,
vacancies and unemployed workers meet at random according to a matching technology.
Specically, the number of new matches formed at productivity level x on each island is
determined by the matching function (n(x);v(x)), where v(x) and n(x) are the numbers
9In the model, C not only measures the pecuniary cost of moving, but it also captures various psychic
costs associated with moving between dierent locations. Therefore, to a certain extent, labor mobility in
the model is also in
uenced by non-economic factors.
10In our calibration, kx increases linearly in x. This might re
ect the fact that hiring at a higher pro-
ductivity level is more costly as rms might have to hire more productive workers to interview a potential
applicant or to train a newly hired worker.
8of vacancies and unemployed workers searching at the productivity level x. The matching
function is non-negative, strictly increasing, concave, and homogeneous of degree one. The
probability that one of these n(x) workers nds a job is f(q(x)) = (1; 1
q(x)), where q(x) =
n(x)=v(x) is the queue length. A vacant job of type x is lled with the probability (q(x)) =
f(q(x))q(x). The wages are determined through Nash bargaining between the worker and
the rm over the match surplus, which refers to the value of the match relative to the sum
of the value of being unemployed to the worker and the value of being separated to the rm.
A rm can enter any island (any local labor market) freely. Flow utility of an unemployed
worker is b. Flow utility of an employed worker is wage w. While employed workers do not
engage in the job search, workers and rms discount their future by the same factor .
By construction, location-specic productivity does not change within a given match.
However, if a worker who is employed at time t 1 at productivity level x becomes unemployed
at time t, she draws her new productivity, xt, from the distribution Pr[xt < x0jxt 1 = x] =
Qs(x0jx). The latter is weakly decreasing in x, implying that an employed worker who has
a better productivity shock will draw her new productivity shock from a more favorable
distribution once she is separated from her current match. If the new shock xt is high
enough, the unemployed worker will stay on her current island and search for a job at the
new productivity level. However, if it is too low, the worker will move to another island to
look for a better opportunity. In that case, the productivity shock associated with the new
island is drawn from the distribution Qm(x).
Each period consists of four stages. At the beginning of each period, some of the old
matches are dissolved. At the same time, the pool of unemployed workers on a given island
is augmented by new workers arriving from the rest of the economy. In the second stage,
workers observe their idiosyncratic shock, x. In the third stage, some of the unemployed
individuals could decide to leave their current island to search for a better opportunity
elsewhere. The probability of arriving at a specic island is the same across islands. Also in
the third stage, rms create vacancies and the unemployed workers who decided to stay in
9the local market search for a job. In the last stage, new matches are realized.
3.2 Value functions and wages
Workers. For a worker of productivity x, let the expected lifetime utility value of searching
for a job on the current island be S(x). Let M denote the value to the worker of leaving the
current island. Then, the value of being unemployed is
U(x) = maxfS(x);Mg: (1)
If a worker of productivity x is employed at wage w, the lifetime utility is given by





Given the probability that an unemployed worker of productivity x nds a job is f(q(x)),
the value of searching for a job on the current island is given by
S(x) = b + f(q(x))W(x) + (1   f(q(x)))U(x): (3)
As a worker moves between islands subject to moving cost C, the net 
ow utility of a mover
is b   C. Then,
M = b   C + 
Z
U(x)dQm(x): (4)
Firms. Let J(x) denote the value to a rm of being matched with a worker of productivity
x:
J(x) = x   w + (1   )J(x): (5)
Then, the value of creating a vacancy at productivity level x is given by
V (x) =  kx + (q(x))J(x): (6)










where 0  
  1 is the worker's bargaining power.
103.3 Measures
Let h denote an individual's employment status: h = 1 if unemployed and h = 0 if employed.
Let (h;x) denote the measure of individuals residing on an island at the moment following
the realization of idiosyncratic shocks. Then, the island's employment and population are
E =
R
(0;x)dx and L =
R
((0;x) + (1;x))dx, respectively.11 Let 
 denote the decision






1 if S(x)  M;
0 otherwise:
(8)
Then, the stationarity of the local labor market condition implies that the total number of






To increase the tractability of the model, the specication of the transition function Qs(x0jx)






(1    )F(x0) if x0 < x;
  + (1    )F(x0) otherwise
(10)
where 0     1 and F denotes the uniform distribution function on the interval [1;1 +
!]. This means that for newly unemployed workers, location-specic productivity remains
unchanged with probability   and changes with probability 1  . When it changes, the new
productivity shock is drawn from F(x). Further, it is assumed that newly arrived workers
also draw their productivity shock from F(x), i.e., for any x 2 [1;1+!], Qm(x) = F(x). So,
the distribution functions Qm(x) and Qs(x0jx) are captured by only two parameters:   and
!.12
11Unless otherwise specied, integrations are taken over the whole domain.
12This specication allows us to obtain a closed-form solution for the homogeneous island model. It also
facilitates the numerical solution of the heterogeneous islands model by reducing the concavity of the value
functions.




Analogous to Lucas and Prescott (1974), the local labor market equilibrium is character-
ized by treating U0 as a parameter. Once workers' job search decision is obtained, U0 is
determined using workers' mobility decision. Solving for the local labor market equilibrium
amounts to nding the wage w(x) and the queue length q(x) for each productivity level x.
Stayers and rms. Let U(x) =
R





where ~  = 1 (1 ). Free entry implies that V (x) = 0 and for all x. Thus, equations (5)








Since W(x) + J(x) is independent of w and V (x) = 0 for all x, the solution to the maxi-
mization problem in equation (7) satises












(q(x)). Inserting the latter into
equation (3) for W(x)   S(x),








The last equation establishes how the queue length q(x) and the value S(x) are related at
the equilibrium for each x. Using equations (12), (13) and (15), it can be shown that















= x + (1    )U0; (16)
where x 2 [1;1 + !]. Since ~      > 0, the left-hand side of equation (16) is strictly
decreasing in q(x). Therefore, this equation pins down the queue length q(x). Then, the
productivity-specic unique wage w(x) can be obtained by using equation (13):




12where x 2 [1;1 + !]. To summarize, given U0, the local labor market equilibrium is charac-
terized by equations (16) and (17).
Further, it is assumed that the queue length is the same across productivity levels. Let
this common queue length be q1. Then, for each productivity level, the probability of nding
a job and the vacancy lling rate are given by, respectively, P and Pq1, where P = (1;1=q1).
This normalization along with equation (16) implies that kx is linear in x. Then, equa-
tion (17) implies that the wage is linear in productivity. Combining equations (15) and (16),
it can be seen that S(x) is also linear in x:
S(x) = 0 + 1U0 + 2x; (18)







, 1 = (1  )2, and 0 = b
1 (1 2(~   )).
Since 2 > 0, higher location-specic productivity means higher life time utility (see Fig-
ure 1).
Movers. Given S(x), the value of leaving the current island is
M = b   C + U0: (19)
If the moving cost C is too high such that M  S(1), there will be no mobility. Conversely,
if the moving cost is too low or even negative such that M  S(1 + !), everyone will move
each period. Therefore, in order for both employment and mobility to be non-zero, there
should exist a cut-o value xc such that S(xc) = M and 1 < xc < 1 + ! (see Figure 1).
Unemployed workers whose productivity shock is less than xc will leave their current island,
while those whose productivity shock is above xc, will search for a job on their current island.















 1 and d2 = d2






2. It can be seen that the left hand side of
equation (20) is the probability that a newly-unemployed worker moves to another island.
13Since d1 > 0 and !2 > 0, it implies that if everything else remains the same, a higher
productivity dispersion means a higher probability of moving upon separation.
Mobility and unemployment. Using the above results, economy-wide mobility and unem-












1 + !   xc




3.5 A permanent local shock
In this economy, there are no unemployment dierences across islands. However, one can
use the above results to see the mechanism through which an island's unemployment can
dier from aggregate unemployment in the presence of high labor mobility. For this purpose,
consider an unanticipated, permanent shock to one of the islands, say, island 1. Suppose
that, due to the shock, per-period output of a rm-worker match on the island is now xz
(as opposed to x in the absence of the shock), where z is a positive number close to 1. z is
referred to as a local technology shock.
Proposition 1. An adverse local technology shock (z < 1) raises the queue length q(x) and
therefore lowers the job-nding rate f(q(x)) in the local market for all x.
Proof. Inserting xz into equation (16) for x and using the fact that the left-hand side of
the equation is strictly decreasing in q(x), it can be seen that q(x) goes up as z declines.
Consequently, the probability of nding a job f(q(x)) = (1; 1
q(x)) on the island will decline
13When ! goes to zero, equation (21) becomes m = 0, while equation (22) converts into the well-known
equation of a one-sector model u = =( + P), where P is the job-nding rate and  is the separation rate.
This shows that in the limit our model converges to the simple one-sector search and matching model in
Pissarides (2000).
14for all x.
The productivity-specic wages of the island will also decline, since the total match
surplus at each productivity level is lower now. As both the wage and the job-nding rate go
down, the value of searching for a job on this island, S(x), declines for all x (see Figure 2).
However, the value of leaving the island, M, remains the same, since there are many islands.
Despite the low job-nding rate, workers whose productivity is high enough will still choose
to search for a job on the island and thus raise the island's unemployment. New workers
will still come to the island from the rest of the economy. These new settlers will have,
on average, higher location-specic productivity for island 1 than those who were arriving
before the permanent shock.14
This suggests that idiosyncratic location-specic productivity can generate a gap between
local and aggregate unemployment while allowing for in- and out-migration. Clearly, higher
variation in the location-match eect will generate higher mobility. However, it is erroneous
to conclude that higher variation in the location-match eect (higher !) can generate higher
unemployment dierences. The reason is as follows. Recent work by Hornstein, Krusell and
Violante (forthcoming) shows that commonly used search models generate too little wage
dispersion. In other words, despite large volatility in labor income shocks, the dispersion
of the accepted income shocks are typically very small in models such as ours. Even if one
were able to generate a sucient within-market income dispersion, it does not necessarily
lead to higher unemployment volatility in the local market. Indeed, Bils et al. (2011) show
that equilibrium search models exhibit a strong trade-o between generating a sucient
wage dispersion and generating a realistic volatility of unemployment. The trade-o arises
because higher ! raises the minimum accepted productivity (equivalently, the gap between
14Productivity dierences of workers on the same island are captured by their location-specic shocks.
It is relatively straightforward to introduce individual-specic permanent eects and schooling levels into
the model. One can also make individuals' productivity grow over time, for instance, by introducing a
probabilistic-aging process. Under such extensions, lower productivity would not necessarily mean lower
wages or higher mobility (Lkhagvasuren, 2007, 2010). However, allowing for such extensions in a way that
would yield empirically plausible life-cycle patterns of income would greatly complicate the analysis without
contributing to our objective of understanding local unemployment and mobility.
15
ow utility of unemployment and productivity), which, in turn, reduces the impact of the
local technology shock on labor market volatility.
Then, the question is whether there is a productivity dispersion (!) that allows us to
generate large gross mobility and substantial unemployment dierences across islands. The
question will be addressed by introducing a stochastic local technology shock and calibrating
the model using the U.S. data. As mentioned earlier, the economy with a stochastic local
technology shock is referred to as the heterogeneous islands model. Before we proceed with
its detailed specication, we analyze how a permanent aggregate shock aects unemployment
and mobility in the homogeneous islands model. The results are useful in understanding how
labor mobility and unemployment are related at the equilibrium.
3.6 A permanent aggregate shock
Consider a permanent aggregate shock that shifts per-period output of all matches from
y = x to y = xa where a is greater than but close to 1. Then it can be seen that the eect of
the shock is equivalent to a marginal increase in !. Therefore, the probability that a newly
unemployed worker leaves his or her island, xc 1
! , will increase. Within-market frictions can
also respond to the aggregate shock. The following statement summarizes the impact of the
aggregate shock on job search.
Proposition 2. An increase in overall productivity raises the job-nding rate for all stayers.
Proof. Clearly, an increase in overall productivity raises the value of searching for a job on
each island (see Proposition 1). This will raise the 
ow utility of separation, U0. Therefore, an
increase in overall productivity will raise both terms on the right-hand side of equation (16)
and thus the job-nding probability f(qx) for all x.
The marginal eect of the aggregate shock on mobility and unemployment can now be
summarized using equations (21) and (22). Since an increase in overall productivity raises
16both xc 1
! and P, (21) implies that mobility will increase with aggregate productivity. Simi-
larly, the impact of the aggregate shock on unemployment can be studied using equation (22).
Specically, combining the equation and the fact that the aggregate shock raises P, xc 1
! , and
m, it can be seen that the total eect of the aggregate shock on aggregate unemployment, u,
is analytically ambiguous. The total eect will be evaluated numerically in Section 6. Nev-
ertheless, equations (21) and (22) imply that if the job-nding rates do not respond to the
aggregate shock (i.e. P = const), mobility and unemployment will be positively correlated.
4 The heterogeneous islands model
Here, each island is subject to a stochastic local technology shock. The shocks are un-
correlated across islands and have a common stationary transition function G(z0jz) given
by
z
0 = 1    + z +  (23)
where 0 <  < 1, and  is a zero-mean normal random variable with variance 2
. These
imply that E(z) = 1 and Var(z) = 2
=(1   2). The timing of the local technology shock is
such that it is realized at the same time as the idiosyncratic productivity shock.
Due to the technology shock, employment on each island will 
uctuate over time. Then,
assuming that production takes place under constant returns and requires labor and land,

ow output of a rm-worker match will depend negatively on local employment.15 This
negative dependence is captured by the following per-period output of a rm-worker match:
y(x;z;") = xz"
  (24)
where 0 <  < 1, z is the island's technology shock, x is the location-specic productivity of
the worker, and " is the ratio of the island's current employment E to its average employment
15When the supply of non-labor input is xed, 
ow output's negative dependence on employment arises
under a quite general setting. See, for example, Rogerson, Visschers and Wright (2009) and Coen-Pirani
(2010) for settings with and without trading frictions, respectively.
17over time E.16
Since the technology shock follows a rst-order autoregressive process, a local labor mar-
ket is now characterized by its current technology shock z and measure . Moreover, the
next period's measure 0 is determined by the current technology shock z and the current
measure . Let   denote this evolution, i.e. 0 =  (z;). Let  denote the stationary






for all z and all (ZM)  (Z M), where Z and M are sets of all possible realizations of
z and , respectively.
4.1 Value functions and wages
Unlike in the homogeneous islands model, the expected life time utility values will now
depend on the local labor market condition (z;). Since 
ow output depends on local
employment, workers and rms need to know  . The information of the economy-wide
distribution  is also necessary, as it aects the value functions of both workers and rms
through the outside option of a worker. Thus, workers and rms have to solve their problem
subject to the law of motion   and the stationary economy-wide distribution . Using
the same notation as in the homogeneous islands model, the value functions are dened as
follows.
To a worker of productivity x, the value of being employed at wage w is given by
















U(x;z;) = maxfS(x;z;);Mg: (27)




t=1 Et, where Et is the island's
employment at time t. Using " instead of E in equation (24) allows us to directly compare the two models
without any further normalization: when there is no local technology shock ( = 0), z = 1 and " = 1, and,
therefore, y(x;z;") = x.
18The life time utility value of searching for a job on the current island is given by















As in the homogeneous islands model, the probability that a worker arrives at a specic
island from their initial move is the same across islands. However, because of repeat mobility,
the probability that a mover settles down on a better island is higher.17 Then, the expected
life time utility value of leaving the current island is
M = b   C + 
Z
U(x;z;)dQm(x)d(z;): (29)
The value of a match to a rm is
J(x;z;) = xz"






Then, the value of a vacancy is given by

























1 if S(x;z;)  M;
0 otherwise:
(33)
17An alternative is to assume directed search across markets under which workers do not go through
repeat mobility. However, Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) argue that assuming directed versus random
search across markets is less important when the model period is short like ours. (In our calibration, the
model period is one week.) The section C.6 provides further reasons why it is even less consequential when
workers dier by their location-specic productivity. Random search across markets is maintained solely
for computational reasons, since it greatly reduces the number of dynamic programming states. See, for
example, Kennan and Walker (2011) for how the number of states increases geometrically with the number
of locations.









































The denition of the equilibrium is given in Appendix C.1.
4.3 Computation
Solving for the equilibrium involves the following two interrelated tasks: (i) nding decisions
of workers and rms conditional on the local labor market condition (z;), the law of motion
 , and the stationary distribution of the islands ; and (ii) nding the law of motion  , and
the stationary distribution , that are consistent with workers' and rms' behavior. The
model is solved using the method of Krusell and Smith (1998), by extending its application
to a decentralized, multi-sector setting.
Given the computational intensity required for the solution, the model is calibrated in
such a way that as many parameters as possible are pre-specied before simulating the model,
while the rest of the parameters are chosen by targeting certain data moments of the U.S.
20economy. For the pre-specied parameters, we resort to prior work on unemployment and
mobility as well as our analytical results.
4.4 Calibration
The length of the time period is a quarter of a month, which will be referred to as a week.
The discount factor  is set to 1=1:051=48, a value consistent with an annual interest rate
of 5 percent. The elasticity of 
ow output of a rm-worker match with respect to land is
set to that in Coen-Pirani (2010):  = 0:015. According to Coen-Pirani (2010), this value
is consistent with an income share of land in manufacturing estimated by Ciccone (2007).
The separation rate is set to the one measured by Shimer (2005); normalizing it to a weekly
frequency,  = 0:1
12 = 0:0083.
The parameters governing search frictions are adopted from Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008). Specically, the bargaining power of a worker, 
, is set to 0.052 and the number of






where  = 0:407. According to Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), for a marginal worker, the

ow utility of unemployment is 0.955. We also use this value for b, meaning that the 
ow
utility of unemployment relative to the lower bound of productivity is 0.955. However, as
workers can move for higher productivity, in our model, the 
ow utility of unemployment
relative to mean productivity is slightly lower than the value.
Given the rest of the parameters, the moving cost C is set to target gross mobility of
2.8 percent (Table 2). As in the homogeneous islands model, the vacancy creation cost kx is
assumed to be linear in x. Specically, the slope of this linear relationship is determined by
equation (16), while the intercept is chosen to achieve the target unemployment rate of 5.7
percent (Shimer, 2005). When there is no local technology shock, mobility and unemploy-
ment are given by equations (21) and (22). On the other hand, in light of equation (16),
the probability of nding a job P = (1;1=q1) depends on k1. Therefore, one can use these
21three equations to obtain reasonable initial guesses on C and kx.
The parameters of the local technology shock,  and , are chosen by targeting the
persistence and volatility of local labor productivity. As in Ciccone and Hall (1996) and
Bauer and Lee (2005), local labor productivity is measured using the logarithm of the ratio
of private non-farm gross state product to employment minus the same variable for the entire
United States. Between 1974 and 2004, for an average state, the cyclical deviation of this
productivity is y=0.027, while its persistence at an annual frequency is y = 0:655. On
the other hand, given the per-period output of a match in equation (24), an island's per-





xt(0;x)dx. Then, annual productivity is calculated











for year ~ t 2 f1;2;:::g.
Consistent with the data, the volatility and persistence of local productivity of the model
economy are estimated using the logarithm of ya
~ t.
The persistence of the location-specic shock x is chosen by combining our earlier an-
alytical results and prior studies on labor income dynamics. First, annual persistence of
productivity of an employed worker is (1   (1    ))48. Second, since the wage is linear in
productivity, the persistence of the wage is equal to that of productivity. On the empiri-
cal side, estimates of the annual persistence of individual labor income ranges from 0.75 to
0.95, depending on how measurement error and unobserved eects are treated (Chang and
Kim, 2007; Guvenen, 2009). A persistence level halfway between the two values is targeted.
Specically, taking into account the logarithmic scale inherent in the persistence parameter,
an annual persistence is 0.866 (= 0:95
p
log0:95(0:75))18 and therefore, (1 (1  ))48 = 0:866.
Given  = 0:0083, this dictates   = 0:697.
The only remaining parameter is !, which measures the volatility of location-specic
productivity. The parameter is important to the analysis since, as discussed in Section 3, it
generates the gap between local and aggregate unemployment in the presence of labor mobil-
18Note that when calculating the persistence of individual income shocks in the model, the eect of the
local technology shock z is ignored. This is for the purpose of making it consistent with empirical estimates
of labor income dynamics, which control for local labor market eects (Chang and Kim, 2007; Guvenen,
2009).
22ity. On the other hand, it can be easily seen that the parameter governs the responsiveness
of labor mobility to the local technology shock. If ! is much lower than =
p
1   2, net
mobility will be much higher. Conversely, if ! is too high, labor mobility will be less sensi-
tive to the local technology shock z and, therefore, the economy will behave very similarly
to that in the homogeneous islands model. Thus, the parameter is chosen by targeting net
mobility of m = 0:011, an estimate obtained in Section 2. It should be noted that although
the parameter ! is monotonically related to net mobility, it also aects the other targeted
moments. For example, equations (21) and (22) suggest that ! will aect unemployment
and mobility. Also, as indicated by equation (24), an increase in ! will make per-worker
productivity less volatile and more persistent. Therefore, the calibration of ! has to be
carried out inter-dependently with that of the other parameters.
4.5 Results
For the remainder of the paper, the current calibration will be referred to as the benchmark
model. Table 3 displays the parameters of the benchmark model. The targeted moments and
the model's predictions on local unemployment are reported in Table 4. The table indicates
that the model performs well along the targeted moments. Most important, it shows that
the model is able to account for large observed cross-sectional dierences in unemployment
while allowing for high labor mobility. Although not directly targeted, the persistence of
local unemployment in the model economy is comparable with that measured from state-level
data. We will talk more about the local unemployment dynamics shortly.
The average wage in the economy is 1.0003. Therefore, C = 5:942 means that the moving
cost is equal to labor income of a month and a half. The vacancy creation cost kx increases
linearly in x and ranges between k1 = 0:831 and k1+! = 1:292. These costs, along with
 = 0:407, imply overall labor market tightness of 0.619, which is slightly higher than 0.539,
the value obtained by Hall (2005), but very close to 0.634, an estimate by Hagedorn and
23Manovskii (2008).
5 Additional evidence: impulse responses
Although Table 4 shows that the model performs well along both volatility and persistence
of local unemployment, it does not provide a detailed picture of how a local labor market
evolves following a local shock. Now we examine whether the model's prediction is consistent
with prior empirical work on the responses of local unemployment to a local labor demand
shock. Blanchard and Katz (1992) were among the rst to analyze the evolution of local labor
markets using state-level data. They estimate a set of time series processes for state-level
employment, unemployment, and participation and derive the associated impulse responses
of the variables to the innovations of the underlying processes. They nd that the eects of
a negative labor demand shock on unemployment disappear after ve to seven years. (See,
for example, Table 1 and Figure 7 of Blanchard and Katz, 1992.)
To see whether the model economy can generate similar impulse responses, the key time
series models proposed by Blanchard and Katz (1992) are applied to simulated data, while
converting them to an annual frequency. First, we consider the following univariate process
for annual employment:
et = a0 +
4 X
j=1
ajet j + e;t; (40)
where et is the log annual employment growth at year t (i.e., et = logEt   logEt 1) and
e;t the innovation term.19 Also, as in their paper, the stochastic behavior of the annual rela-
tive unemployment rate is examined by employing the following second-order autoregressive
process:
rt = a0 + a1rt 1 + a2rt 2 + r;t; (41)
where r;t is the innovation term. Using the regression coecients of the two equations,
we obtain the associated impulse responses, which trace the individual responses of the
19The univariate process (40) is identical to equation (2) in Blanchard and Katz (1992).
24employment level and the unemployment rate to an innovation in e;t and r;t. Table 5
displays the regression coecients and the impulse responses. It shows that, in response
to an innovation of 1.0, employment increases to about 1.5 after three to four years and
then in the long run reaches a plateau at about 1.3. Blanchard and Katz (1992) report that
depending on the individual states, the long-run response lies between 1.0 and 2.0. So, the
model's prediction is highly consistent with Blanchard and Katz (1992) in that simulated
data exhibit both the hump shape and the magnitude of the employment response found in
state-level data. The impulse response of unemployment is also highly consistent with what
they found: the eect of a shock falls to only 23 percent of the initial shock within four years
and is essentially equal to zero within ten years.
In addition to the above univariate processes, Blanchard and Katz (1992) also consider
a trivariate process. More specically, for each state they consider a log-linear system of
employment, the employment growth rate, and labor market participation. Since our model
does not allow for the labor force participation decision, it might be too simple to compare
its predictions with those implied by the trivariate process. However, Blanchard and Katz
(1992) report that estimating a bivariate system of employment and the employment growth
rate (dropping labor market participation) delivers nearly identical impulse responses for
employment and unemployment (Blanchard and Katz, 1992, footnote 35). Keeping these in
mind, we consider the following bivariate process:20
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
et = a1;0 +
2 X
j=1
(a1;1;jet j + a1;2;j~ et j) + e;t;
~ et = a2;0 +
2 X
j=1
(a2;1;jet j+1 + a2;2;j~ et j) + ~ e;t;
(42)
where et is, as before, the local log employment growth, and ~ et is the local log employment
rate minus the aggregate log employment rate: et = log(Et=Et 1) and ~ et = log(Et=Lt)  
log(E). Given this system, we trace the joint responses of the unemployment rate and
log employment to a negative unit shock to log employment (e;t =  1). Given ~ e, the
20This system is identical to the trivariate system on page 32 of Blanchard and Katz (1992), except it
excludes the participation rate.
25associated change in the unemployment rate is calculated as  (1   u)~ e where u = 0:057.
The estimated bivariate impulse responses are plotted in Figure 3. They show that in
the rst year, a decrease in employment of 1 percent is associated with an increase in the
unemployment rate of 0.45 percentage points. The eect on unemployment steadily declines
over time and disappears after ve to six years. Over time, the eect on employment builds
up, to reach a peak of -1.61 percent after three years and a plateau of about -1.04 percent.
These joint impulse responses of employment and unemployment obtained from simulated
data are remarkably consistent with those obtained by Blanchard and Katz (1992) from
state-level data. (See Figure 7 of their paper.)
6 Implications on the cyclicality of mobility
We now consider an aggregate productivity shock and examine whether the responses of
the model economy are consistent with the data. Specically, the model is simulated while
raising the local technology shock and the idiosyncratic productivity shock of each match
(z and x) by 1 percent.21 Table 6 summarizes the responses of the key aggregate variables.
It shows that an increase in aggregate productivity lowers unemployment but raises overall
mobility, wages and the number of vacancies. These responses are highly consistent with
both the pro-cyclicality of labor mobility in the U.S. shown in Figure 4 and Abraham and
Katz (1986), who argue that cyclical variations in unemployment and vacancies are primarily
driven by aggregate shocks.
These results provide additional evidence of how well the model performs along a dimen-
sion that is not targeted as part of the calibration. Using our analytical results in section 3.6,
it can be seen that within-market trading frictions are essential for generating the negative
correlation between unemployment and mobility. This means that ignoring trading frictions
21In other words, the model is solved under a permanent increase in aggregate productivity. Although
it is straightforward to introduce an aggregate stochastic shock into the model, its solution imposes a very
heavy computational burden as both the law of motion   and the islands' distribution  become no longer
time-invariant.
26could lead to an important oversight regarding how unemployment and mobility are related
at the equilibrium.
It should be noted that the Lucas and Prescott model predicts counter-cyclical labor
mobility as mobility and unemployment move together in their model.22 Moreover, it is
unclear how to obtain procyclical mobility using the assumption that preference shocks or
shifts in local attractiveness are the main driving force of labor mobility. Under such an
assumption, an increase in overall productivity will make mobility relatively expensive and
employment relatively cheap. Therefore, the assumption may even generate counter-cyclical
labor mobility.
Although the paper focuses on geographic mobility, its results have important implica-
tions for labor mobility across occupations and industries. Recent work by Kambourov and
Manovskii (2009) and Moscarini and Vella (2008) nd that occupational mobility is also
procyclical. The latter paper also discusses earlier empirical studies that nd evidence on
the procyclicality of inter-industry mobility. These ndings in the literature, along with our
results, raise the possibility that labor market dynamics of the sort modeled in this paper
may also be relevant to occupational and industrial mobility.
7 Conclusions
Motivated by large cross-state unemployment rate dierences as well as a high degree of
labor mobility, I construct an equilibrium multi-sector model that merges two of the central
frameworks of equilibrium unemployment: the island model (e.g., Lucas and Prescott, 1974)
and the search and matching model (e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). Using the
interaction of idiosyncratic location-specic productivity and trading frictions between rms
and workers, the model is able to generate large locational dierences in unemployment and
high labor mobility. The model also generates key features of local labor market dynamics,
including those documented in the seminal work of Blanchard and Katz (1992). The model
22Also, see Lilien (1982), who relates sectoral mobility to cyclical unemployment.
27is consistent with the procyclicality of regional mobility, which also provides insights into
the procyclicality of occupational and industrial mobility documented by recent empirical
studies (e.g., Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009 and Moscarini and Vella, 2008).
The paper demonstrates that introducing trading frictions into an otherwise standard
model of sectoral reallocation greatly improves its prediction while breaking the tight link
between mobility and unemployment in the model. Our results indicate that neglecting
equilibrium eects induced by trading frictions between workers and rms could lead to
the conclusion that unemployment and mobility are positively related, although their true
relation could be negative.
With appropriate extensions, our model could also shed light on other questions of policy
relevance. Given micro-data for other countries, like the European Union, the model could be
calibrated to Europe. The model could, then, be used to evaluate the extent to which lower
labor mobility in Europe contributes to its higher unemployment rate. The model could also
be used to examine the impact of lowering the costs of switching sectors or training costs
on the unemployment rate. Also, it would be of interest to examine whether a coordinated
policy that optimally chooses moving cost subsidies and unemployment insurance benets
can enhance welfare more eectively than a policy that simply chooses benets. Another
interesting but both computationally and empirically much harder exercise would allow for
ex-ante dierences in ability among workers. This type of an extension of the model would
measure the composition of movers by observed and unobserved ability and thus would
allow for a quantitative evaluation of competing policies that tie benets to individuals'
labor income.
References
Abraham, Katharine G. and Lawrence F. Katz (1986). \Cyclical Unemployment: Sectoral
Shifts or Aggregate Disturbances?" Journal of Political Economy, 94 (3): 507{522.
Alvarez, Fernando and Robert Shimer (2011). \Search and Rest Unemployment," Econo-
metrica, 79 (1): 75{122.
28Alvarez, Fernando and Marcelo Veracierto (1999). \Labor-Market Policies in an Equilibrium
Search Model," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 14: 265{304.
Alvarez, Fernando and Marcelo Veracierto (2000). \Equilibrium Search and Labor Market
Policies: A Theoretical Analysis," Mimeo, University of Chicago.
Andolfatto, David and Paul Gomme (1996). \Unemployment Insurance and Labor Market
Activity in Canada," Carnegie{Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 44: 47{82.
Bauer, Paul and Yoonsoo Lee (2005). \Labor Productivity Growth Across States," Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland Policy Discussion Paper, 16.
Bils, Mark, Yongsung Chang and Sun-Bin Kim (2011). \Worker Heterogeneity and En-
dogenous Separations in a Matching Model of Unemployment Fluctuations," American
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 3: 128{154.
Blanchard, Olivier and Lawrence Katz (1992). \Regional Evolutions," Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, 23 (1): 1{61.
Borjas, George J., Stephen G. Bronars and Stephen J. Trejo (1992). \Self-Selection and
Internal Migration in the United States," Journal of Urban Economics, 32 (2): 159{
185.
Chang, Yongsung and Sun-Bin Kim (2007). \Heterogeneity and Aggregation: Implications
for Labor-Market Fluctuations," American Economic Review, 97 (5): 1939{1956.
Ciccone, Antonio (2007). \Agglomeration Eects in Europe," European Economic Review,
46: 213{227.
Ciccone, Antonio and Robert Hall (1996). \Productivity and the Density of Economic Ac-
tivity," American Economic Review, 86 (1): 54{70.
Coen-Pirani, Daniele (2010). \Understanding Gross Worker Flows Across U.S. States," Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics, 57 (7): 769{784.
Dahl, Gordon (2002). \Mobility and the Return to Education: Testing a Roy Model with
Multiple Markets," Econometrica, 70 (6): 2367{2420.
Galindev, Ragchaasuren and Damba Lkhagvasuren (2010). \Discretization of Highly Persis-
tent Correlated AR(1) Shocks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 34 (7):
1260{1276.
Greenwood, Michael J. (1997). \Internal Migration in Developed Countries," in Mark R.
Rosenzweig and Oded Stark, eds., \Handbook of Population and Family Economics
Vol. 1B," New York: North Holland.
Guvenen, Fatih (2009). \An Empirical Investigation of Labor Income Processes," Review of
Economic Dynamics, 12.
Hagedorn, Marcus and Iourii Manovskii (2008). \The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Un-
employment and Vacancies Revisited," American Economic Review, 98 (4): 1692{1706.
Hall, Robert E. (2005). \Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness," The
American Economic Review, 95 (1): 50{65.
Hornstein, Andreas, Per Krusell and Giovanni Luca Violante (forthcoming). \Frictional Wage
Dispersion in Search Models: A Quantitative Assessment," American Economic Review.
Kambourov, Gueorgui and Iourii Manovskii (2009). \Occupational Mobility and Wage In-
equality," Review of Economic Studies, 76: 731{759.
Kennan, John and James R. Walker (2011). \The Eect of Expected Income on Individual
Migration Decisions," Econometrica, 76 (1): 211{251.
King, Miriam, Steven Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, Sarah Flood, Katie Genadek, Matthew B.
29Schroeder, Brandon Trampe and Rebecca Vick (2010). \Integrated Public Use Micro-
data Series, Current Population Survey: Version 3.0. [Machine-readable database],"
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
Krusell, Per and Anthony A. Smith, Jr. (1998). \Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the
Macroeconomy," Journal of Political Economy, 106 (5): 867{896.
Lilien, David M. (1982). \Sectoral Shifts and Cyclical Unemployment," Journal of Political
Economy, 90 (4): 777{793.
Lkhagvasuren, Damba (2007). Local Labor Market Dynamics with Net and Gross Mobility:
Implications on Unemployment and Wages, Ph.D. thesis, University of Rochester.
Lkhagvasuren, Damba (2010). \Wage Dierences Between Migrant and Non-Migrant Work-
ers: Regional Volatility of Labor Income Shocks," Working Paper, Concordia University.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. and Edward C. Prescott (1974). \Equilibrium Search and Unemploy-
ment," Journal of Economic Theory, 7: 188{209.
Mincer, Jacob (1978). \Family Migration Decisions." The Journal of Political Economy,
86 (5): 749{773.
Mortensen, Dale T. and Christopher A. Pissarides (1994). \Job Creation and Job Destruction
in the Theory of Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, 61 (3): 397{415.
Moscarini, Giuseppe and Francis Vella (2008). \Occupational Mobility and the Business
Cycle," Working Paper 13819, NBER.
Pissarides, Christopher A. (2000). Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, Cambridge: MIT.
Rogerson, Richard (1987). \An Equilibrium Model of Sectoral Reallocation," Journal of
Political Economy, 95 (4): 824{834.
Rogerson, Richard, Robert Shimer and Randall Wright (2005). \Search Theoretic Models of
the Labor Market: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, 43 (4): 959{988.
Rogerson, Richard, Lodewijk P. Visschers and Randall Wright (2009). \Labor Market Fluc-
tuations in the Small and in the Large," International Journal of Economic Theory,
5 (1): 125{137.
Rouwenhorst, Geert K. (1995). \Asset Pricing Implications of Equilibrium Business Cycle
Models," in Thomas Cooley, ed., \Structural Models of Wage and Employment Dynam-
ics," Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Shimer, Robert (2001). \The Impact of Young Workers on the Aggregate Labor Market,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116 (3): 969{1007.
Shimer, Robert (2005). \The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacan-
cies," American Economic Review, 91 (1).
Topel, Robert H. (1986). \Local Labor Markets," Journal of Political Economy, 94 (3):
S111{S143.




cyclical unemployment of the U.S. 0.245
cross-country unemployment of Europe 0.403
(0.039)
cross-country unemployment of Europe, 0.355
excluding Spain and Switzerland (0.021)
Controlling for size and xed eects of states
CVL across states (weighted) 0.204
(0.033)
CVLF across states (weighted and xed eects free) 0.148
(0.034)
Notes: The table summarizes volatility of unemployment across time and space. Cross-
state unemployment dierences and aggregate unemployment were measured using the BLS's
monthly state unemployment and labor force series of Jan. 1976 - May 2011 (http://www.
bls.gov/lau/home.htm). European annual unemployment data of 2003-2010 were obtained
from the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (http://stats.oecd.org) and
include the following 18 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and United Kingdom. Over the sample period, the average unemployment rate
of these 18 countries is 6.7 percent.
31Table 2: Labor Mobility








net mobility, m 0.011
Notes: Labor mobility was constructed using the Integrated Public Use Micro Sample
(IPUMS) of the CPS of 1982-1984, 1986-1994, and 1996-2010 (King et al., 2010).
32Table 3: Parameters of the Benchmark Model
Parameter Value Description
 0:9990 the time discount factor
 0:0083 the separation rate
 0:407 the parameter of the matching technology

 0:052 a worker's bargaining power
[k1;k1+!] [0:831;1:292] the vacancy creation cost
b 0:955 
ow utility of unemployment
 0:015 the parameter of the local technology
C 5:942 the moving cost
 0:0045 the conditional std.dev. of the local technology shock
 0:9882 persistence of the local technology shock
! 0:076 volatility of the idiosyncratic shock
  0:697 persistence of the idiosyncratic shock
33Table 4: Benchmark Model
Moments Model Data
Calibration targets
aggregate unemployment, u 0:057 0:057
gross mobility, m 0:028 0:028
net mobility, m 0:011 0:011
volatility of per-worker output, y 0:027 0:027




local unemployment dierences, CVFL 0:153 0:148
autocorrelation of monthly unemployment, corr(rt;rt+1) 0:988 0:994
overall market tightness 0:619 0.539-0.634
Notes: Per-worker output refers to the ratio of total output produced in the local market
over a given year to its average annual employment. Overall market tightness is dened as
the ratio of the total number of vacancies in the economy to aggregate unemployment.




one lag 0.480 0.832
(0.031) (0.042)






root mse 0.013 0.006
Implied impulse responses
year 1 1.000 1.000
year 2 1.480 0.832
year 3 1.496 0.486
year 4 1.414 0.233
year 5 1.343 0.094
year 10 1.323 -0.002
year 20 1.322 0.000
Notes: This table estimates univariate models of relative employment and unemployment
using simulated data and traces the implied impulse responses. The specications of the
univariate models are those used by Blanchard and Katz (1992) to analyze state-level em-
ployment. The upper panel displays the coecients of lagged dependent variables (the log
employment growth and the unemployment rate) and the root mean squared error of the
regression. Standard errors of the coecients are in parentheses. The lower panel shows the
implied impulse responses of log employment and the unemployment rate to innovation of 1.
It can be seen that both the coecients and the impulse responses are remarkably consistent
with those in Table 1 of Blanchard and Katz (1992).
35Table 6: The Cyclicality of Gross Mobility
aggregate unemployment, u -7.82%
overall mobility, m +78.69%
the average wage, w +1.02%
the number of vacancies, v +9.42%
Notes: The table summarizes the impact of a permanent increase in aggregate productivity
on the key aggregate variables. It shows that an increase in aggregate productivity lowers
unemployment and raises labor mobility, which is consistent with the observed procyclicality
of gross mobility shown in Figure 4.
36Figure 1: Mobility Decision
-






    
movers
    
stayers
S(x) is the value of searching for a job on an island when location-specic productivity for
that island is x 2 [1;1 + !]. M is the value of leaving the island to look for a better job
elsewhere. Unemployed workers whose productivity level is less than xc leave their current
island and those whose productivity level is equal to or higher than xc stay.
37Figure 2: Impact of a Permanent Local Technology Shock
-









This gure shows how the value of searching for a job on an island responds to an unan-
ticipated permanent technology shock to the island. S(x) and S0(x) denote the value of
searching for a job on the island before and after the realization of the shock, respectively.
M is the value of leaving the island to look for a better job elsewhere. Also see notes to
Figure 1.
38Figure 3: Joint Impulse Responses of Employment and Unemployment















Notes: The gure plots the joint impulse responses of the unemployment rate and log
employment to a negative unit shock to log employment using simulated data. The bivariate
system used to construct the impulse responses are provided in equation (42). It can be seen
that both the shape and the magnitude of the responses are highly consistent with those
obtained by Blanchard and Katz (1992) using state-level data. (See Figure 7 of their paper.)
39Figure 4: Aggregate Unemployment and Gross Mobility
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Notes: The upper panel plots aggregate unemployment and gross inter-state mobility in the
U.S. over the period of 1980 through 2009 (The CPS does not record inter-state mobility for
the years 1985 and 1995). The lower panel plots the cyclical deviations of these two series
from their respective linear trends. Over the sample period, the correlation coecient of the
deviations,corr(ut;mt), is -0.58 at the signicance level of 0.01.
40A Data appendix
This appendix provides further empirical details.
A.1 Reasons for moving in the CPS
The CPS records the reasons for moving for those who moved during the past year. The
question oers 17 response categories, ordered under four main groupings: family, employ-
ment, housing, and other reasons. Table A.1 summarizes responses to this question. It shows
that among inter-state movers, the highest percentage of people answer that they move for
employment-related reasons followed by family- and housing-related reasons. For white male
workers, the percentage of the employment-related reasons is even higher. Clearly, some of
the residential moves are recorded as an inter-state move. For example, an individual could
be moving from Jersey City, NJ to New York, NY for family-related reasons without actually
changing his or her labor market. Thus, reasons for moving between neighboring states may
dier from reasons for moving between labor markets. To reduce the eects of neighboring
states, longer distance moves are considered. Table A.1 shows that the relative frequency of
employment-related moves increases with the moving distance and thus conrms that most
of the moves between dierent local markets are made for employment reasons.
It is important to note that the CPS records only one reason for a mover. It is natural to
expect that a worker takes many factors into account before making any relocation decision.
For example, Mincer (1978) nds that individuals' relocation decisions are substantially
in
uenced by the labor income prospects of their spouse. Thus, given that inter-state moves
are frequently accompanied by a change in employment status or a new employment relation,
it seems reasonable to think that moves that are reported as non-employment related are
also in
uenced by economic factors.
iTable A.1: Distribution of Movers by Reason for Moving, 1999-2009
Between States Between Census
Divisions
Reason for moving All White All White
Male Male
employment 45.3% 51.6% 53.8% 59.2%
family 23.5% 20.2% 22.2% 19.0%
housing 20.2% 18.3% 11.3% 10.5%
other 11.0% 9.9% 12.7% 11.3%
Notes: The percent distribution of movers of the same group and the same type of moves
is presented by a column in the table. Reasons labeled \other" include attending or leaving
college, change of climate and health. The main sample includes adult civilians aged 20-64
years who work for wages or salary. (When the sample is restricted to workers who are
between 28 and 60 years of age, the frequency of employment-related reasons is even higher
than those in the table.)
A.2 More on unemployment dierences
This appendix provides further facts on cross-state unemployment dierences and shows that
the dierences remain large under various specications.
A.2.1 Persistence
Between Jan. 1976 and May 2011, monthly autocorrelation of the relative state unemploy-
ment ri averages 0.9938 with a standard deviation of 0.0057. A weighted average of the
monthly autocorrelation of relative unemployment using the labor share of each state as
the weight gives virtually the same value, 0.9940. This suggests that local unemployment
dierences are as persistent as aggregate unemployment.23
Nevertheless, to quantify the persistence of overall unemployment dierences, the ob-
served unemployment dierences are decomposed into two components: a part due to per-
sistence of local unemployment and a part attributable to temporary shifts in state unem-
ployment. For this purpose, let us assume the following autoregressive process for the relative
23Using a quarterly autocorrelation of aggregate unemployment of 0.87 reported by Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008), monthly autocorrelation of aggregate unemployment is 0.955 (= 0:871=3).
iiunemployment rate of state i: rit+1 = ri(1   %) + %rit + it+1, where % is the persistence of
monthly autocorrelation, ri is the state xed eect, and it is an i.i.d transitory innovation
with zero mean and variance 2
. Then, for any i, Var(rit+1) = %2Var(rit) + 2
: The station-





: Therefore, our decomposition suggests that
approximately 98.8 percent (= 0:9942  100%) of the variance CV
2
0 is attributable to the
persistence of local unemployment (even after controlling for state xed eects), while the
remaining 1.2 percent is due to current shocks.
A.2.2 Dierences by proximity
As individuals are less likely to move to distant labor markets, it is possible that unem-
ployment dierences between neighboring states are much smaller than dierences between
distant states. The eect of the proximity of local labor markets is examined using unem-
ployment dierences between larger sub-national geographic units: census regions and census
divisions. In particular, the proportion of cross-state unemployment dierences attributable
to dierences within these larger geographic groups is calculated using the following de-
composition: CV
2
0 = BG + WG, where BG denotes between-group dierences and WG
within-group dierences. Since there are nine divisions and four regions, within-division
dierences should be lower than within-region dierences. Over the sample period, on aver-
age, only 17 percent of the total cross-state variance CV
2
0 is due to dierences between the
regions, and the remaining 83 percent is due to dierences between states that belong to the
same region. For census divisions, as expected, the proportion of within-group dierences
is a little lower and averages 55 percent. So, within-group dierences dominate between-
group dierences in both cases. These ndings suggest that cross-sectional unemployment
dierences are substantial even between proximate states.
iiiA.2.3 Dierences by age
As shown in Table A.2, young workers move more frequently than their older cohorts. There-
fore, it is possible that cross-state dierences in unemployment between local labor markets
are smaller among the younger labor force, while unemployment dierences are largely gen-
erated by less mobile prime-age and older workers. To examine whether this is the case,
cross-state unemployment dierences by age groups are measured. Table A.3 shows that the
cross-sectional variation of unemployment remains large even after controlling for age.
One could also look at cross-state dierences by education. However, to our knowledge,
there are no reliable data on unemployment by education at the local level. Nevertheless,
using the fact that unemployment dierences remain large among young workers and that un-
employment is high among less educated workers, one can see that unemployment dierences
among less educated young workers are high, despite their high labor mobility measured in
Table A.2.
Table A.2: Mobility by Age and Education
Age (yrs.) No-College College All
20-34 0.037 0.058 0.044
35-54 0.017 0.021 0.018
55-64 0.011 0.014 0.012
Notes: The table displays inter-state mobility by age and education using the CPS of 1981-
2010. The sample includes adult civilians aged 20-64 years who are in the labor force. The
education category "College" includes individuals who have a college degree or above.





Notes: The numbers are calculated using state unemployment series by race, sex and main
age group. These series were issued by the BLS for 1978-2004 and are now discontinued.
The data were provided by Shimer (2001).
ivA.3 Cancelation of in- and out-migration
In Section 2 it is shown that the bulk of in- and out-migration cancel out at the local level.
One can ask how much gross mobility is needed to generate the observed net mobility of
m = 0:011 if the two 
ows do not cancel out at all. If a local market experiences either
in-migration (in that case out-migration is zero) or out-migration (in that case in-migration
is zero), the overall mobility will be mi;t = ji;tj=2 and Eiti;t = 0. Let ~  denote the ratio of









Eitji;tj : Then, assuming that i;t follows a
normal distribution, ~  = 2
p
E2=Ejj, where  is a standard normal variable. Since E2 = 1
and Ejj =
p
2=, ~  =
p
2. This implies that the minimum mobility needed to generate
the observed annual shifts of a local labor force is 0.0044 (= 0:011 p
2 ). This indicates that
approximately 84 percent (' (1   0:0044=0:028)  100%) of labor 
ows cancel out at the
local level.
A.4 Local productivity
Annual per-worker productivity by state for 1974 through 2004 were obtained from Bauer
and Lee (2005), who construct these series using gross domestic product by state released
by the BEA. The BEA's estimation methodology of gross domestic product is provided at
http://bea.doc.gov/regional/gsp/help/. Local productivity is dened as the logarithm
of per-worker gross state product minus the logarithm of per-worker gross domestic product
of the entire U.S.. In the data, there is a substantial variation in the relative productivity
growth rates across states. Specically, during the sample period, the productivity of some
states has steadily grown at 0.8 percent per year relative to the national average, while the
productivity of some states has declined, with rates of -0.8 percent relative to the national
average. Since relative unemployment exhibits no trend (Blanchard and Katz, 1992), the
relative productivity is de-trended using state-specic linear trends. Then, for each state,
the standard deviation and annual autocorrelation of these de-trended shifts are calculated.
The weighted average of these standard deviations using the labor share of each state as
vthe weight is 0.028, while the weighted average of state-specic annual autocorrelation is
0.657. According to Ciccone and Hall (1996), some states in which the natural resources
are suciently important for their economic activity, gross state product per worker gives
extremely volatile output measures. When Alaska, Louisiana, West Virginia and Wyoming
are excluded, as in Ciccone and Hall (1996), the volatility and persistence measures become
0.027 and 0.655, respectively. For comparison purposes, we also look at the cyclical variation
of per-worker gross domestic product of the entire U.S. The standard deviation of the cyclical
component of per-worker product of the U.S. is 0.024, and its annual autocorrelation is 0.756.
Then, the implied quarterly and monthly autocorrelation are 0.933 and 0.977, respectively.
These numbers are very close to those measured from hourly productivity in Shimer (2005)
and Bils et al. (2011), and thus, it is reassuring that gross state product per worker provides
a reasonable measure of labor productivity.
A.5 Unemployment dierences between movers and stayers
Here we examine how unemployment and mobility are related at the individual level. Specif-
ically, we measure how unemployment diers by mobility status using the CPS of 1982-2010.
To focus on mobility that is not aected by schooling and retirement, the sample is restricted
to those who are between 28 and 60 years of age and in the civilian labor force. In the sam-
ple, unemployment among movers and non-movers is 10.0 and 4.1 percent, respectively. This
means that movers are 2.5 times more likely to be unemployed than non-movers. Since both
unemployment and mobility dier considerably across age and education of the labor force,
one might be concerned that the bulk of the unemployment gap between movers and non-
movers could be explained by age and education. To examine whether this is the case, the
following regression is considered for two main education levels, high school and college:
~ ui;s;t = ~ di + s + t +~ bXi + ~ i;s;t (43)
viTable A.4: Unemployment by Mobility Status (%)
High School College
unemployment among movers 12.8 6.6
unemployment among stayers 5.6 2.6
dierence, ~  7.183 4.345
(0.287) (0.223)
Notes: The employment and mobility statuses are measured from the CPS of 1982-2010.
The unemployment rates and their dierences are reported in percentages. Standard errors
are in parenthesis. We consider the education level labeled \high school diploma or equiv-
alent" in CPS (King et al., 2010) as high school education and the one labeled \Bachelor's
degree" as college education. ~  measures unemployment of movers relative to that of stayers
while controlling for individuals' observed characteristics as well as year and state eects.
where ~ ui;j;s;t is a dummy for whether person i is unemployed, di is a dummy for whether the
person is a mover, s and t are the state and year eects, and Xi is a set of controls such
as sex, a quartic polynomial of age and a dummy whether the person is white. The results
displayed in Table A.4 show that among observationally identical workers, movers are still
more likely to be unemployed than non-movers.
These results are consistent with our assumption that movers are unemployed. In fact, in
the heterogeneous agent model, unemployment among workers who arrived at their current
location within the last 48 weeks is 18.9 percent, while unemployment among stayers is 5.3
percent. Thus, in the model, movers are 3.6 (=18.9/5.3) times more likely to be unemployed
than stayers, as opposed to 2.3 (=1+7.2/5.6) to 2.7 (=1+4.4/2.6) times as likely in the data.
Clearly, if on-the-job search is allowed, the model can generate lower unemployment
among movers. One can also introduce heterogeneity along ex-ante unobserved ability, mov-
ing cost and the leisure value to target dierences between movers and stayers. In practice
though, it is dicult, if not impossible, to obtain reliable data that allow us to measure the
data moments required to quantify the relative eect of these elements.
On the other hand, the smaller mover-stayer unemployment gap in the data can be
partially attributed to inconsistency between the time at which workers move and the time
viiat which their unemployment and mobility statuses are recorded in the data. Specically,
the CPS records an individual's mobility status in March. However, it is well known that
geographic mobility peaks in the summer. Therefore, many unemployed workers who move in
the summer will already have found a job by the following March, suggesting that the actual
unemployment gap between movers and stayers could be higher than what is measured in
Table A.4. Since the CPS does not record the timing of its respondents' geographic moves,
it is impossible to measure this bias. Nevertheless, the large unemployment gap between
movers and stayers in the model is comparable with that in the data.
B Analytical details of the homogeneous islands model
This appendix provides further analytical details.
B.1 Extreme cases
If everyone moves each period, the moving cost is so low (or even negative) that
S(1 + !)  M: (44)
Then it follows that U0 = M = b C
1 . Combining the latter with equation (44) and S(x) =
0 + 1U0 + 2x, it can be shown that C  C0 where C0 = b  
1 
1 1(0 + 2(1 + !)):
If no one moves, the moving cost is so high that
M  S(1): (45)
Since maxfS(x);Mg = S(x), it follows that
R
S(x)dF(x) = S(1 + !




1 1 and S(x) =
0+12(1+ !
2 )
1 1 + 2x. Inserting the last two equations into (45), it







Let C0 < C < C1. Then,
M = b   C + U0: (46)
Since M = S(xc) = 0 + 1U0 + 2xc, it follows that
U0 =
2xc + 0   b + C
   1
: (47)
On the other hand,
U0 = 0 +
Z xc
1
(1U0 + 2xc)dF(x) +
Z 1+!
xc
(1U0 + 2x)dF(x): (48)
Taking the integration and combining the result with (47) give us a quadratic equation for
xc. Solving the equation while taking into account the eect of the moving cost will yield
(20).
B.3 Mobility and unemployment
The probability that a newly unemployed worker leaves her current island is F(xc) = xc 1
! .
Since both newly unemployed and newly arrived workers draw their productivity shocks
from the same distribution, some of the newly arrived workers will decide to leave their new
location again. Therefore, the number of movers is given by
m = ((1    )
Z 1+!
xc
(0;x)dx + m)F(xc): (49)
Furthermore, in equilibrium, the 


























Since the size of the labor force is normalized to one, it must be the case that
m +
m









Solving the latter for m and inserting F(xc) = xc 1
! into the result yield the equilibrium
mobility rate (21). Finally, the sum of the total numbers of movers and stayers gives us the
unemployment rate (22).
C Details of the heterogeneous islands model
This appendix provides the denition of the equilibrium of the heterogeneous agent model
as well as the details of the numerical methods used to nd the equilibrium. It also discusses
some of the modeling choices.
C.1 Denition of the equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of a set of value functions, fU, S, W, M, V , Jg, a mobility decision
function, 
, wages w, the measures, f, m, vg, the queue length, q, a law of motion,  , and
an economy-wide distribution, , such that
1. unemployed: given S and M, the decision rule 
(x;z;) and the value function
U(x;z;) solve (27);
x2. employed: given   and U, the value function W(x;z;) solves (26);
3. stayer: given q,  , , U and W, the value function S(x;z;) solves (28);
4. mover: given U and , the value function M solves (29);
5. matched rm: given  , the value function J(x;z;) solves (30);
6. vacancy creation: given  , J, and q, the value function V (x;z;) solves (31);
7. free entry: for any triplet (x;z;), V (x;z;)  0;
8. consistency of q: for any triplet (x;z;), q(x;z;)v(x;z;) = 
(x;z;)(0;x);
9. consistency of   and : equations (25), (36) and (37) hold.
C.2 Perceived law of motion
The stationary distribution  aects the model economy through the value of leaving the
current island, M, and the mobility rate, m. The assumption on   is that the next period's
employment is a function of the current technology shock, employment and labor force. The
function will be referred to as the perceived law of motion. Given M, m and the perceived law
of motion, the local labor market equilibrium is solved. Using the equilibrium, the behavior
of a measure one of workers across a continuum of islands is simulated. Numerical iteration
on the perceived law of motion is performed until the behavior of workers is consistent on
M and m.
The specication of the perceived law of motion for employment is given by
p
0 = 11 + 12z + 13p + 14`; (54)
where p =  ln" and ` = lnL. Since rms and workers have to forecast employment of the
subsequent periods, they also need to forecast the future labor force. For this purpose, it is
assumed that the log-labor force evolves according to the following equation:
`
0 = 21 + 22z + 23`: (55)
xiThis means that, to forecast future employment, workers and rms have to know the current
local labor force L and relative employment ". Equivalently, the agents have to know the
local population and the local unemployment rate.
Under the benchmark parameterization, the perceived law of motion is given by:
p
0 = 0:00062   0:00062z + 0:9027p   0:0014` (56)
subject to
`
0 =  0:00850 + 0:00847z + 0:9983`: (57)




t=t0(at a)2, where at is the
simulated value of a variable, ^ at is the predicted value of at and a is the mean of the
variable. The model is simulated for 50000 periods. The values for R2 associated with
the regressions (56) and (57) are, respectively, 0.99996 and 0.99997. So, the aggregate
approximation method works very well for the model in the sense that forecasting errors
that result from omission of the other moments of the measure  are extremely small.
Given equations (54) and (55), the local labor market equilibrium is obtained using
value function iteration. The stochastic process G(z0jz) is approximated using a 3-point
Markov chain. The grid points and the transition matrix of the Markov chain are cal-




2 g, where z is the unconditional standard deviation of the local technology
shock z. The grids of ` are given by the following ve equally-spaced points: f0;0:1;0:2g.
Having many grid points along the idiosyncratic shock, x, is essential for solving the
model. If a suciently ne grid is not maintained along x, the size of the local labor force
and employment will evolve in a stepwise pattern due to heavier mass points inherited from
the coarser grid. The latter, in turn, will make it dicult to retrieve a meaningful law of
motion for p and `. On the other hand, the combination of the large state space and the
24Galindev and Lkhagvasuren (2010) show that the method outperforms the other commonly used dis-
cretization methods for high persistence.
xiitwo innite dimensional objects (  and ) makes it impossible to carry out the computation
with almost \continuous" x. For this reason, two types of grid points are used. First, the
value functions and the decision rules are solved on a coarser grid of 21 equispaced grid
points on [1;1+!]. Due to the linearity assumptions of search and vacancy costs, the value
of stayer, S, does not have much curvature along x. Therefore, the value functions and
decision rules obtained from numerical iteration are robust to the number of coarser grid
points. Given the value functions associated with the coarser grid of x and the grids of (p;`),
the value functions associated with a ner grid of 121 equispaced points of x 2 [1;1+!] and
the realized values of (p;`) are calculated using three-dimensional linear interpolation. Once
the decision rules for the ner grid are available, simulating the economy amounts to simple
matrix manipulation.
C.3 Numerical algorithm
The key elements of the numerical algorithm are as follows:
1. Guess the mobility rate, ^ m
0
, and the value of moving, ^ M0.
2. Guess the coecients of (54) and (55). Let ^ 0




14g and ^ 0




denote the values of the coecients. A good initial guess may come from the economy
with no local technology shock, i.e., ^ 0
1 = f0;0;1;0g and ^ 0
2 = f0;0;1g.
3. Given ^ 0
1, ^ 0
2 and ^ M0, solve for the value functions U, S and W, the job-nding rate
f(q) and the queue length q. This step involves the following iterations:






0. (The values indexed
by y and z denote the values on the coarser and ner grids, respectively.)
(b) Given the parametric law of motion, calculate the value of the matched rm, J0,
as a function of wage, w0.






0, nd wy and qy at each point of the coarser grid.
































1g and go to (a).
4. By applying linear interpolation to Uy, Sy and qy, generate the job-nding rate f(qz)
and the mobility decision 
z on a ner grid of x.
5. Using 
z, f(qz), and ^ m, generate articial time series data for 50000 periods: fpt;`tg50000
t=1 .
6. Estimate the coecients of (54) and (55) using fpt;ltg50000
t=3000. Let the estimates be
^ 1




14g and ^ 1
2 = f^ 1
21; ^ 1
22; ^ 1
23g: If ^ 0 = f^ 0
1; ^ 0
2g and ^ 1 = f^ 1
1; ^ 1
2g
are close enough, go to the next step; otherwise revise the coecients by setting ^ 0 =
~ 1^ 0 + (1   ~ 1)^ 1 for some 0 < ~ 1 < 1 and go to Step 3.
7. Using the simulated time series for a large number of islands, measure the mobility
rate. Let ^ m1 be the measured mobility rate. Also, using all realized combinations of
z, p and ` in the simulated data, calculate the value of leaving the current island, M.
Let the value be ^ M1.
8. If the assumed values, ^ m
0
and ^ M0, are close enough to the realized values, ^ m
1
and
^ M1, stop. Otherwise, update the initial guess according to ^ m
0
= ~ 2 ^ m
0
+ (1   ~ 2)^ m
1
and ^ M0 = ~ 2 ^ M0 + (1   ~ 2) ^ M1 for some 0 < ~ 2 < 1 and go to Step 2.
C.4 Allowing for endogenous separation
If the local technology shock of an island declines abruptly, there can be rm-worker matches
whose x is too low to stay on the island. These are likely to be the matches formed at lower
location-specic productivity levels when the island had a high z. Let  denote the total
xivvalue of the current match. Using equations (26) and (30), the total value is given by















Since the value of a separated rm is zero, it is ecient to separate matches whenever the
total match surplus (x;z;)   M becomes negative.25 However, given the calibration in
Section 4, (x;z;) > M for all realized values of (x;z;). So, there is no endogenous
separation. This is not to say that endogenous separation is irrelevant to local labor market
dynamics. Instead, it means that there is no inecient match in the model economy.
The main reason behind this result is that the 
ow value of the dynamic equation (58) is
xz" . First, location-specic productivity x is greater than one and does not change within
a given match. Second, the stochastic process G is approximated by a nite-state Markov
chain with three grid points, f0:9689;1;1:0311g. Therefore, the 
ow utility of unemployment
is less than the lowest value that z can take. Third, even if z drops sharply, the local
population declines quickly to reduce the impact of the adverse shock on the existing matches
as indicated by the coecients of (54) and (55).
C.5 Random versus directed search across markets
Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) argue that assuming random versus directed search across
markets is less important when the model period is short like ours. Further, location-specic
productivity shocks in our model make the dierence between random and directed search
even less important. Because workers in our model take into account not only the local
labor market condition (z;) but also their location-specic productivity x. In other words,
workers may prefer to move to islands where they have high x although the local labor
market condition on the new island is worse that that in the initial location. For this type
25See Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005) and Bils et al. (2011) for endogenous separation in a setting
with match-specic productivity.
xvof move, assuming random versus directed search across labor markets is inconsequential.
Therefore, the main dierence caused by random versus directed search across markets is the
number of repeat moves. Since, in our calibration, individuals' life time utility varies more
along location-specic productivity x than labor market condition (z;), repeat mobility is
negligibly small compared with unemployment. Moreover, unemployment duration is much
longer than the model period. Therefore, the number of repeat moves in the model is too
small to have any signicant impact on the simulated moments.
Even if repeat mobility were large, there are various ways to embed the model with
random mobility into a setting with directed mobility. One simple way is to count a repeat
mover as a resident of his or her initial location until he or she settles in a particular labor
market. Therefore, as long as repeat mobility is not directly targeted, assuming random
versus directed search across islands is less important in the model. For theoretical properties
of models with random search, see Alvarez and Veracierto (1999, 2000). Also see Kennan
and Walker (2011), who use a random search setting to study regional mobility patterns of
young high school graduates.
C.6 Sensitivity analysis
Now we show how the parameters governing idiosyncratic productivity aect the key mo-
ments. Table C.1 displays the moments that are obtained under dierent combinations of
the values of ! and  1, while setting the vacancy creation costs and the moving cost to sat-
isfy equation (21) and equation (22) and keeping the others xed at their benchmark values.
The results show that key targeted moments exhibit a gradual and monotonic response to
the combination of the two parameters.
xviTable C.1: Sensitivity Analysis
! = 0:07 ! = 0:07 ! = 0:09 ! = 0:09
  = 0:6   = 0:8   = 0:6   = 0:8
u 1:003 1:004 0.999 0.995
m 1.207 0.861 1.110 0.852
m 1:504 0:612 0.806 0.570
CVFL 0:978 1:102 0.941 0.960
corr(rt;rt+1) 0.99982 1.00002 0.99982 0.99995
Notes: This table shows that the key moments exhibit a monotonic, gradual response to
joint shifts in   and !. The moments are relative to those in the benchmark model.
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